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INTRODUCTION
In June 2021, Representative Ilhan Omar questioned Secretary of
State Antony Blinken during a House Foreign Affairs Committee
hearing and stirred controversy. She noted that the United States
opposed the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s then-ongoing probe
into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Afghanistan
and Palestine, whether at the hands of the United States, Israel,
Hamas, or the Taliban, and also explained no domestic courts had yet
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taken up these matters. The Congresswoman asked Secretary Blinken:
“Where do we think victims are supposed to go for justice?” 1
Representative Omar’s comments launched several news cycles’
worth of commentary, mostly featuring outrage by some who rejected
what they perceived as false moral equivalence between inequivalent
actors, 2 followed by pushback to that backlash by many who saw the
controversy as a product of bad-faith smears rooted in Islamophobia. 3
However, most failed to identify the underlying context behind her
question. Longstanding unresolved tensions exist between the United
States and the ICC that most recently culminated in the Court
launching an investigation into apparent war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by all parties to the conflict in
Afghanistan, including the United States. However, the Court then
backed away from that investigation after pressure from the United
States. Even as this investigation stalled, the United States’
unwillingness to face accountability for its own abuses or those of its
powerful allies continued. Thus, even after the controversy became
less visible in the press, Representative Omar’s original question
remained unanswered on the merits: where do the victims of these
atrocities find justice?
This article will demonstrate that the outcome of the latest U.S.ICC clash carries deep ramifications that span far beyond the case in
question. At stake: the United States’ self-assigned role as a leader
* Elizabeth Beavers received her LLM. in National Security and International
Human Rights Law from Georgetown University Law Center in 2021, and her J.D.
from Regent University School of Law in 2012. She is a strategist and consultant in
Washington, D.C. advising public interest advocacy organizations on issues of
peace, security law, and policy. Beavers formerly held positions lobbying Congress
and organizing grassroots activism around issues of national security and human
rights at Indivisible, Amnesty International USA, and the Friends Committee on
National Legislation (Quakers). Her analyses on these topics have been published in
many outlets, including the New York Times, USA Today, Newsweek, and Reuters.
Beavers is a member of the North Carolina State Bar.
1. Rep. Ilhan Omar (@Ilhan), TWITTER (June 7, 2021, 3:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/Ilhan/status/1401985884191404041.
2. Sarah Ferris, Dem Leaders Seek To Deescalate Omar Drama, POLITICO
(June 10, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/10/omar-back-underscrutiny-493055.
3. Progressives Support Rep. Omar Against Bad-Faith Attacks, WIN WITHOUT
WAR (July 8, 2021), https://winwithoutwar.org/progressives-support-rep-omaragainst-bad-faith-attacks/.
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defending human rights and the rule of law globally as well as the
Court’s legitimacy as an arbiter of justice. Part I of this paper first
reviews the long history of U.S.-ICC tensions before turning to the
specifics of the Court’s aborted investigation of U.S. abuses in
Afghanistan and the various legal implications of these abuses. Part II
outlines accountability efforts already taken within the United States,
including gaps in those efforts or areas where it is unclear what steps
have been taken. Part III analyzes the high stakes in the aftermath of
the U.S.-ICC dispute and recommends paths forward.
I. KEY BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
Soon after taking office, the Biden administration revoked
Executive Order 13928, a measure enacted by the former Trump
administration that had placed economic sanctions and travel
restrictions on the ICC’s prosecutor and her senior aide. 4 The Trump
administration enacted measures in retaliation of the prosecutor’s
efforts to investigate apparent war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by the United States in Afghanistan in a blatant attack on
the Court and international organizations in general. 5
Executive Order 13928 was the latest, but not the first flashpoint
in tensions between the Court and the United States. No U.S.
administration has ever supported ratification of the Rome Statute
governing the International Criminal Court. The Clinton
administration signed, but did not ratify, the Rome Statute, which
signaled tacit support from the United States and a commitment not to
work in opposition of the agreement’s object and purpose.
Nevertheless, the U.S. refrained from begin placed under the scope of
the Court’s jurisdiction. 6

4. Press Release Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, Ending Sanctions and
Visa Restrictions against Personnel of the International Criminal Court, (April 2,
2021),
https://www.state.gov/ending-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-againstpersonnel-of-the-international-criminal-court/.
5. John Bolton, Remarks before the Federalist Society on the International
Criminal Court, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/
60674/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court/.
6. William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International
Criminal Court, GOV. INFO. (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf.
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In a dramatic turn, the George W. Bush administration, led in its
efforts at the time by then—U.N. Ambassador John Bolton,
announced an un-signing of the former Clinton administration’s Rome
Statute signature. 7 More aggressively, the George W. Bush
administration negotiated bilateral treaties with multiple countries by
leveraging foreign aid in an effort to secure immunity for U.S.
personnel in those countries. 8 One of the more bizarre turns in the
long-running U.S.-ICC conflict was the American Service Members
Protection Act of 2002, more colloquially known as the “Hague
Invasion Act.” 9 This statute, which remains in effect as of this writing,
triggered an authorization of military force in response to any
detention of U.S. or allied personnel by the Court and barred any
cooperation in the Court’s investigations.
Paradoxically, instances of synergy have existed between the
Court and the United States. American negotiators involved
themselves deeply in the process of developing the Court and its
procedures from the earliest phases of the project. The U.S.
government even explicitly supported referral of certain cases to the
Court, such as for the Darfur genocide or crimes by the Lord’s
Resistance Army. The U.S. government also consistently voiced broad
support for accountability for international atrocities. 10
Although the United States refused to become a member state of
the International Criminal Court, the Court nonetheless asserted
jurisdiction over the State for its conduct in Afghanistan. However,
7. John R. Bolton, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ARCHIVE (May 6, 2002), https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
8. Stephen Pomper, The Int’l Criminal Court’s Case against the United States
in Afghanistan: How it happened and what the future holds, JUST SECURITY (Nov.
13, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46990/international-criminal-courts-case-us-afghanistan-happened-future-holds/.
9. American Servicemembers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-206 (Aug. 2,
2002) [hereinafter “ASPA”].
10. See, e.g., The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Sep. 2, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/02/qaSOCIETY
OF
international-criminal-court-and-united-states;
AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, TASK FORCE ON POLICY OPTIONS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE ICC (April 2021), https://www.asil-us-icc-task-force.org/uploads/2021ASIL-Task-Force-Report-on-US-ICC-Engagement-FINAL.pdf; Jane Stromseth, The
United States and the International Criminal Court: Why Undermining the ICC
Undercuts U.S. Interests, 47 GEORGIA J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 639 (2019).
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per the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction had several limitations.
First, only a small list of crimes were subject to investigation and
prosecution by the Court: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. 11 Within these contours, further limitations existed on the
cases taken up by the Court.
A matter can come before the Court in one of three ways: upon
referral by a member state, by referral from the United Nations
Security Council, or upon the Prosecutor’s own initiation, known as
proprio motu authority, with approval of a Pre-Trial Chamber. 12
Situations taken up by the Court through state referral or proprio motu
channels must have occurred on the territory of or by the nationals of
a member state. 13 From there, the Prosecutor applies another screen to
assess the case’s gravity and complementarity. A gravity review
entails an assessment of the scope and impact of the crimes.
“Complementarity” refers to the principle that the Court may not
proceed if the state with jurisdiction is pursuing its own genuine
investigations or prosecutions. 14 The final screen applied to potential
cases is the Court must find that pursuing the case would serve the
“interests of justice.” 15
Afghanistan ratified the Rome Statute and became a member state
of the Court in 2003. 16 In 2007, the Prosecutor initiated a preliminary
examination into crimes committed in Afghanistan by all parties to the
conflict and, a decade later, requested authority from the Pre-Trial
Chamber to initiate a formal investigation. 17 Although the Pre-Trial
Chamber initially declined to authorize, the Appeals Chamber
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998), at art. 5-85-8 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
12. BETH VAN SCHAACK AND RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 3-12 (2015).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, STATE PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE
(2004), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/
afghanistan.aspx.
17. CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN AFGHANISTAN (April 5, 2021), https://ccrjustice.org/
home/what-we-do/our-cases/accountability-international-crimes-afghanistan.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021

5

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2021], Art. 3

90

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52

reversed the decision and paved the way for the formal investigation
to begin in March 2020. 18
The United States continued to insist that, as a non-member of the
Court, its personnel could not be subjected to its jurisdiction.19 In
September 2021, the new Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan announced
that he would move away from investigating any crimes in
Afghanistan besides those committed by the Taliban and the armed
group known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province. 20 Effectively, this
announcement meant the ICC succumbed to U.S. pressure and would
cease investigating U.S. crimes. This development only reinforced the
question of if, and how, the U.S. could ever be held to account for its
crimes in Afghanistan.
II. UNITED STATES CRIMES IN AFGHANISTAN
The question of who has the power to secure justice, and how that
justice will be secured, is more than a legal or academic exercise.
There are real victims and survivors whose lives and well-being
depend on the answer. In the case of crimes committed by U.S.
personnel in Afghanistan, it is important to note that there is no full,
official accounting of what happened. However, there is publicly
available information which this article relies upon that provides
pieces in the overall puzzle in the form of declassified government
documents, journalism, non-criminal investigations, and reports by
non-governmental organizations.
The United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated a
program facilitating rendition, detention, enforced disappearances,
secret detention, and torture in a network of overseas “black sites”
from 2002 to 2009. 21 In these sites, men were subjected to cruel and
18. Id.
19. Blinken, supra note 4.
20. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.
A. Khan QC, following the application for an expedited order under article 18(2)
seeking authorization to resume investigations in the Situation in Afghanistan
(September 27, 2021), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=2021-09-27otp-statement-afghanistan.
21. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ‘S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
PROGRAM,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,
178
(Dec.
3,
2014),
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f-
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gruesome abuses. Most of the American public’s understanding of
U.S. torture seems to revolve around “waterboarding,” a practice
simulating the excruciating experience of drowning. 22 Indeed, one
detainee in the program appeared to be broken down by the tactic to
the extent that he automatically began walking to the waterboard and
lying down when interrogators would snap their fingers. 23 After one
session in which he hysterically pleaded for mercy, he became
unresponsive and required medical intervention. 24 The abuse was
much more complicated and widespread than just the waterboarding
sessions. Extreme sleep deprivation, beatings, confinement in coffinlike spaces, mock executions, and stress positions were common. 25
Many who survived the black sites now live with life-long
consequences, including severe mental illness such as paranoia and
psychosis. 26
Specific to what happened in Afghanistan, it appears there were at
least four black sites in the country. 27 One infamous location known
as the Salt Pit was described by an interrogator as “the closest thing he
had seen to a dungeon,” and explained to the Senate Intelligence
Committee in a partially-declassified report:
[T]he windows at Detention Site Cobalt [the Salt Pit] were blacked
out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The [redacted] guards
monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played
constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were
shackled to the wall and given buckets for human waste. Four of
the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of the
cell. Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with
289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A6D9FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf
[hereinafter Torture Report].
22. Eric Wiener, Waterboarding: A Tortured History, NPR (Nov. 3, 2007),
https://www.npr.org/2007/11/03/15886834/waterboarding-a-tortured-history.
23. Torture Report, supra note 21, at 43.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink and James Risen, How U.S. Torture Left a
Legacy of Damaged Minds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/09/world/cia-torture-guantanamo-bay.html.
27. Amnesty Int’l, USA: Crimes and impunity: Full Senate Committee report
on CIA secret detentions must be released, and accountability for crimes under
International law ensured, AMR 51/1432/2015 (Apr. 2015), https://www.amnesty.
org/en/documents/amr51/1432/2015/en/ [hereinafter CIA Secret Detentions].
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their hands above their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore
not allowing them to sleep.28

At least one detainee’s imprisonment at the Salt Pit was hidden
from the International Committee of the Red Cross. 29
In the Salt Pit and elsewhere in Afghanistan’s black sites,
detainees were chained to the ceiling clad only in diapers and left that
way for days or weeks. 30 Some were prevented from sleeping for days
and experienced hallucinations as a result. 31 Many began to behave
like dogs in a kennel, cowering when their cell doors were opened. 32
One detainee was “hung by his wrists from a bar above his head with
his toes just reaching the floor (the so-called ‘strappado’ position). 33
This, he says, was like being stretched on a medieval rack and was ‘so
painful that no one put in this position could stand it for even a
moment.’ He would be left there for six to eight hours before being
brought back for further interrogation.” 34
Another man named Gul Rahman died of hypothermia after
interrogators doused him in cold water and chained him half-naked to
the concrete floor overnight. 35 His family still has not been able to get
information from the U.S. government about what happened to his
body. 36 Still, others were subjected to humiliating nudity and sexual
assault including penetration with foreign objects. 37 One man was
submitted to sexual assault with such “excessive force” that he
28. Torture Report, supra note 21, at 49.
29. CIA Secret Detentions, supra note 27, at 56.
30. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 73 (Apr. 2013), https://
detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/Full-Report.pdf.
31. CIA Secret Detentions, supra note 27, at 32.
32. Torture Report, supra note 21, at 50, n. 240.
33. RENDITION PROJECT, CIA Prisoners, Hassan Bin Attash, https://www.
therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/hassan-binattash.html# (last visited Nov. 29,
2021).
34. Id.
35. Hajira Hematyara, The CIA killed my father. What did they do with his
body? WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thecia-killed-my-father-what-did-they-do-with-his-body/2018/11/30/f743ba66-ed0811e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.
36. Id.
37. Torture Report, supra note 21, at 100, n. 584.
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continues to suffer from rectal prolapse. 38 These are the known
abuses, but Senate investigators warned the “full details of the CIA
interrogations there remain largely unknown” because “multiple uses
of sleep deprivation, required [forced] standing, loud music, sensory
deprivation, extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food,
nudity, and ‘rough treatment’ of CIA detainees” in Afghanistan went
undocumented. 39
The Rome Statute identifies torture as a crime against humanity40
and a war crime, 41 and defines it as “the intentional infliction of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control of the accused.” 42 Of course, the
applicability of the Rome Statute to U.S. behaviors remains a subject
of intense dispute between the parties. But even setting the Rome
Statute aside and looking purely at international agreements that the
U.S. has willingly ratified, torture is overwhelmingly, clearly, and
indisputably a grave crime. 43
The Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) affirms in Article 2 that
the prohibition on torture cannot be derogated from under any
circumstances, 44 and the United States signed the treaty in 1988 and
ratified it in 1992. 45 The International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, which the United States signed in 1977 and ratified in
1992, 46 prohibits torture in Article 7. 47 Common Article 3 of the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998), at art. 7(1)(f) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2.2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
45. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Nov.
14, 2021).
46. Id.
47. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Geneva Conventions, ratified by the United States in 1955 48 and
widely understood to be binding as a matter of customary international
law, 49 prohibits torture in the context of an armed conflict. 50 These
same provisions of international law not only prohibit torture but
require accountability for violations.
The prohibition on torture is also firmly embedded within U.S.
domestic law. The CAT was incorporated by Congress into U.S. law
via what is often called the “torture statute,” 51 and the War Crimes
Act also affirms the prohibitions of the Geneva Conventions. 52
Additionally, U.S. federal courts have forcefully reiterated the
prohibition on torture, including in the landmark case Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala, in which the court stated “[a]mong the rights universally
proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of
physical torture.” 53 Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer
has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind.” 54
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY
As previously discussed, a key element in all cases before the
International Criminal Court is the principle of complementarity. The
Court is meant to be a court of last resort. As such, the Rome Statute
makes clear that the ICC’s jurisdiction will not apply if the state
investigates the same criminal behavior on its own. This is true even if
the state’s investigation leads to a decision not to prosecute. 55 Thus,
one exit ramp from this heated dispute could have been a
demonstration of complementarity from the United States. Indeed,

48. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, 1 (2004), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf.
49. Definition of War Crimes, Rule 156. Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Constitutes War Crimes, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(2005), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156.
50. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(a).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
53. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. Id.
55. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at 10.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss1/3

10

Beavers: Where Do They Go for Justice? The United States International Cri

2021]

WHERE DO THEY GO FOR JUSTICE?

95

former National Security Advisor John Bolton denounced the Court,
explaining:
[The ICC is] superfluous, given that domestic U.S. judicial systems
already hold American citizens to the highest legal and ethical
standards. When violations of law do occur, the United States takes
appropriate and swift action to hold perpetrators accountable. We
are a democratic nation with the most robust system of
investigation, accountability, and transparency in the world. We
believe in the rule of law, and we uphold it. We don’t need the ICC
to tell us our duty or second-guess our decisions. 56

Thus, to determine whether the principle of complementarity
could still be demonstrated in this case since the ICC has declined to
pursue its investigation further, it is essential to assess what
accountability steps the United States government has already taken.
The U.S. Congress has conducted investigations into post-9/11
torture. In 2009, the Senate Armed Service Committee released a
report documenting its findings after examining torture committed by
the military. 57 Perhaps most prominently, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence conducted an investigation over the course
of seven years based on the C.I.A.’s own documentation and produced
an accompanying report that remains classified in its full 6,000-page
form. 58 However, a nearly 600-page partially redacted Executive
Summary was released in 2014. 59
The executive branch also conducted investigations. In particular,
the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) created a review
within the Department of Justice. 60 This investigation looked into the
conduct of lawyers within the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) who
56. Bolton, supra note 5.
57. S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, (Comm. Print 2018), https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Detainee-Report-Final_April-222009.pdf.
58. Torture Report, supra note 21, at 1.
59. Id.
60. OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECT TERRORIST (July 29, 2009), https://fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/opr-final.pdf [hereinafter OPR Report].
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authored permission slip-esque memos, often referred to as “torture
memos.” 61 In these memos, the lawyers distorted the law to justify a
policy of torture and give a facade of lawfulness to the torture
program. 62 As one scholar described the memos, they “were based
upon terminally faulty legal reasoning, deliberately obtuse
interpretations of settled international law, the omission of adverse
facts and precedents, and the inappropriate, and at times, knowingly
erroneous, use of inapposite case law, statutes, and scholarly work,”
concluding the memos “were necessarily faulty” as the attorneys who
wrote them were “tasked with justifying the unjustifiable.” 63 In its
report summarizing the investigation, OPR concluded OLC attorneys
had engaged in professional misconduct. 64 The Department of Justice
ultimately overruled OPR’s recommendations and declined to
recommend disciplinary action. 65
Some people were prosecuted for their role in carrying out the
crime of torture, but they were almost entirely within the U.S. military
court-martial system, and such prosecutions were limited to low-level
officers. 66 Outside the military justice system, one contract
interrogator employed with the CIA was prosecuted for exceeding
authorized tactics and torturing a detainee until he died. 67
61. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, Ten Years Later, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/thetorture-memos-10-years-later/252439/.
62. See Jake Romm, No Home in this World: The Case against John Yoo
before the International Criminal Court, 20 INT’L. CRIM. L. R. 862, 862-63 (2020).
63. Id.
64. OPR report, supra note 60, at 260.
65. DAVID MARGOLIS, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION REGARDING THE OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS OF
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY’S
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA
CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF
“ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, 2 (Jan. 5,
2010), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-margolis.pdf.
66. By the Numbers, Finding of the Detainees Abuse and Accountability
Project, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 25, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/
25/numbers/findings-detainee-abuse-and-accountability-project [hereinafter DAA
Project].
67. Former CIA Contractor Speaks Out About Prisoner Interrogation, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/convicted-former
-cia-contractor-speaks-prisoner-interrogation.
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This means, to date, there have been no criminal investigations
into the actions of senior U.S. officials who planned and carried out
the crime of torture. 68 Famously, soon after being elected to replace
the administration responsible for these crimes, then-President Obama
declared his desire to “look forward, not backward.” 69
This was exactly what happened. 70 In 2009, Attorney General
Eric Holder appointed U.S. attorney John Durham to conduct a
“review” of interrogations during the Bush administration to
determine whether formal criminal investigations should follow.71
Steven Rapp, the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes serving during
the Obama administration, argued in the midst of the Durham review
that the work of the “independent counsel appointed by Attorney
General Eric Holder” would be complicated. He explained:
[I]f there were cases that could be pursued, they would involve very
complex issues as to whether people could be held criminally
liable, at what level there could be individual responsibility, and
whether the causes of death or injury could now be proven. A
number of other issues would also have to be evaluated,” but
concluded that it was “a genuine investigation that I think satisfies
the standard of complementarity if we were a member of the ICC. 72

However, Rapp’s analysis was deeply flawed for multiple
reasons. 73 First, Durham was not an independent counsel. He was an
attorney already within the Department of Justice and working under

68. DAA Project, supra note 66.
69. David Johnston & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look into Bush
Programs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/
politics/12inquire.html.
70. ERIC HOLDER, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC HOLDER
REMARKS REGARDING A PRELIMINARY REVIEW INTO THE INTERROGATION OF
CERTAIN DETAINEES (Aug. 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-regarding-preliminary-review-interrogation-certain-detainees.
71. Id.
72. Press Briefing with Stephen J. Rapp Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes
Issues, U.S. MISSION GENEVA (Jan. 22, 2010), https://geneva.usmission.gov
2010/01/22/stephen-rapp/.
73. Scott Horton, Rapp for the Defense, HARPER’S MAG. (Jan. 26, 2010),
https://harpers.org/2010/01/rapp-for-the-defense/ (examining and critiquing Rapp’s
comments).
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its supervision. 74 Additionally, he was not conducting a criminal
investigation, only a preliminary review to determine whether actual
criminal proceedings should follow. 75 Further, the scope of Durham’s
mandate was limited in an important way: he was not to explore
criminal culpability for anyone who relied upon the OLC memos and
acted within their scope. 76 This limitation was a significant caveat, as
it meant senior U.S. officials who created and authorized the torture
program would not be investigated. Further, the limited scope also
meant clear acts of torture under the bad-faith auspices of the OLC
memos would escape review. 77
President Obama personally wrote to CIA employees at the time
to assure them that anyone who followed Department of Justice (DOJ)
advice in using “enhanced” interrogation techniques would not face
prosecution:
The men and women of the CIA have assurances from both myself,
and from Attorney General Holder, that we will protect all who
acted reasonably and relied upon legal advice from the Department
of Justice that their actions were lawful. The Attorney General has
assured me that these individuals will not be prosecuted and that the
Government will stand by them. 78

By limiting the Durham investigation so narrowly, the Obama
administration helped to ensure the Bush administration’s efforts to
evade accountability were successful.
Indeed, at the conclusion of Durham’s review, he recommended
investigations into the deaths of two detainees in custody, but
otherwise closed his preliminary review without full criminal
investigation or prosecution. 79 Moreover, those recommended
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Leon E. Panetta on the Release of Department of Justice Opinions (Apr. 16, 2009),
https://fas.org/irp/news/2009/04/cia041609.html.
79. ERIC HOLDER, DEP’T OF JUST., STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC
HOLDER ON CLOSURE OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE INTERROGATION OF CERTAIN
DETAINEES (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorneygeneral-eric-holder-closure-investigation-interrogation-certain-detainees
[Hereinafter Holder Press Release].
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investigations into the two detainee deaths never materialized into any
charges. 80 Multiple survivors of the U.S. torture program have since
come forward to say that they were not afforded an opportunity to be
interviewed as part of the Durham investigation, and indeed there
appears to be no evidence suggesting any survivors were
interviewed. 81 No concluding reports or findings from the Durham
investigation have been made public by the Justice Department as of
the date of this writing.
John Yoo, lead author of the “torture memos,” enjoys a
prestigious position as a law professor and frequent media
contributor. 82 Jay Bybee, who signed off on many of those same
“torture memos,” is a federal judge. 83 Donald Rumsfeld, who as
Defense Secretary oversaw, authorized, and pushed to expand torture
techniques, passed away in June 2021, remaining a free man who
spent his retirement years developing mobile gaming applications.84
James Mitchell, who made millions of dollars working as a contractor
with the CIA to help design its torture techniques now sells memoirs
of his crimes and speaks about them frequently on cable news and at
think tanks. 85 Unfortunately, there is a very long list of individuals
80. Scott Shane, No Charges Filed in Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-outprosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html.
81. Spencer Ackerman, Former CIA Detainees Claim US Torture
Investigators Never Interviewed Them, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2014, 5:54 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/11/libyan-cia-detainees-tortureinquiry-interview; US: CIA Torture is Unfinished Business, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Dec. 1, 2015, 9:20 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/01/us-cia-tortureunfinished-business.
82. Fran Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent
Prosecutorial Oversight of the Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J. OF L. AND PUB.
POL’Y 271, 308 (2010), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1327&context=cjlpp.
83. Id.
84. Graison Dangor, Rumsfeld–Defense Secretary Who Led U.S. To War In
Iraq–Dead At 88, FORBES (June 30, 2021, 6:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/graisondangor/2021/06/30/rumsfeld-defense-secretary-the-led-us-to-war-iniraq-dead-at-88/?sh=27085e9b7f7e.
85. Dror Ladin, There’s So Much We Still Don’t Know About the CIA’s
Torture Program. Here’s How the Government Is Keeping the Full Story a Secret,
TIME (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:19 AM), https://time.com/5779579/cia-torture-secrecy/
(discussing James Mitchell’s memoirs); Psychologists Behind CIA ‘Enhanced
Interrogation’ Program Settle Detainees’ Lawsuit, NPR (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:52 PM),
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intimately involved in planning, carrying out, and working to cover up
the crime of torture, who now live lucrative and free lives.
IV. WHAT’S AT STAKE
Having examined what is known about the atrocities planned and
perpetrated by U.S. officials in Afghanistan, as well as the scope of
accountability efforts, an inescapable conclusion emerges: by failing
to conduct genuine criminal investigations or prosecutions into the
senior officials responsible for the crime of torture, the United States
has not met the complementarity standard of the International
Criminal Court. 86 Thus, the principle of complementarity cannot be
met, and additionally the ICC has elected not to intervene even as this
sort of case is precisely where the ICC was designed to step in: when
grave crimes have occurred, yet the responsible state has not been held
accountable or even provided full transparency. Before discussing
what potential steps toward justice may still be available, it is essential
to assess the stakes and the broader consequences that stem from a
continued delay in accountability.
A. Consequences Within the United States
The government’s decision to embrace a policy of torture,
followed by the choice to award a de facto amnesty to those
responsible, has had significant consequences within the United
States. Culturally, torture has been absorbed by the American public
as a justifiable policy option in some circumstances, rather than a
crime of international atrocity that is never permissible. This
acceptance of torture is reflected in recent opinion polling, as a
majority of Americans surveyed consistently indicate support for
using torture against people suspected of acts of terror. 87 In 2016,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/17/544183178/psychologistsbehind-cia-enhanced-interrogation-program-settle-detainees-lawsuit
(discussing
money paid by the CIA to its contractors).
86. See Kaveri Vaid, What Counts as State Action under Article 17 of the
Rome Statute—Applying the ICC’s Complementarity Test to Non-Criminal
Investigations by the United States into War Crimes in Afghanistan 44 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 573 (2012) (analyzing the complementarity standard and explaining
why U.S. non-criminal investigations do not comply).
87. See e.g. Christopher Ingraham, Let’s Not Kid Ourselves: Most Americans
are Fine with Torture, Even When You Call it “Torture,” WASH. POST (Dec. 9,
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Americans elected Donald Trump for President after he campaigned
on “bring[ing] back waterboarding, and a hell of a lot worse.” He also
stated, “[D]oes torture work? . . . Absolutely.” 88 Particularly striking
was President Trump’s direct use of the word “torture,” as even the
Bush-era officials who had actually approved and conduct had
hesitated to label it as such. Trump’s campaign rhetoric and
subsequent election indicated a cultural willingness to openly embrace
and defend torture as an option.
Popular media has also reflected these trends, with numerous
films and television shows depicting U.S. torture as heroic, an
unfortunate necessity, or a tool that makes us all safer, rather than a
crime that is unjustifiable in any circumstances. 89 Many Americans
received their information about torture from the hit show 24, in
which protagonists frequently engaged in torture as acts of heroism to
protect the country. 90 A senior military official expressed concern
with how the show popularized the notion of torture, saying, “The
kids see it, and say, ‘If torture is wrong, what about 24?’”91
Unfortunately, 24 portrayed what was already reality: those who
torture were, and often still are, lauded as patriotic officials acting out
of necessity.
Moreover, 24 does not stand alone in this depiction of torture as
acceptable or even necessary. Another film to take this approach was

2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/09/lets-not-kidourselves-most-americans-are-fine-with-torture-even-when-you-call-it-torture/;
Chris Kahn, Exclusive: Most Americans Support Torture Against Terror Suspects,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2016, 3:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-torture-exclusive/exclusive-most-americans-support-torture-against-terrorsuspects-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKCN0WW0Y3.
88. James Masters, Donald Trump Says Torture ‘Absolutely Works’—But
Does It?, CNN (Jan. 26, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/26/
politics/donald-trump-torture-waterboarding/index.html.
89. Mark Hughes Cobb, Torture Prevalent in Movies, UA Researchers Say,
TUSCALOOSANEW.COM (Feb. 10, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.tuscaloosanews.
com/story/news/local/2020/02/10/torture-prevalent-in-movies-ua-researcherssay/1738573007/.
90. Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2007),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/02/19/whatever-it-takes (quoting U.S.
Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan).
91. Id.
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Zero Dark Thirty, which critics have derided as “torture porn.” 92
After spending significant time graphically depicting CIA torture, the
film shows torture as instrumental in leading the U.S. government
directly to Osama bin Laden, a fact that is demonstrably false. 93 Even
worse, children’s media has adopted similar depictions of torture. For
example, extended torture scenes are played for a laugh in the original
Shrek and Minions films. 94
Furthermore, these depictions of torture are found in areas outside
of fictionalized media. Even sources of information intended to be
serious, official, and rigorous, such as museums, seem to have
absorbed the perspective that torture may be justifiable, or at least
debatable as an option, in certain circumstances. For example, the
International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. installed an exhibit on
post-9/11 U.S. torture. 95 Rather than educating visitors that torture is
an abhorrent crime with no exceptions or explaining that the torture
program was a heinous chapter in U.S. history, the display featured a
mock waterboard for guests to lie on. 96 The display even showed
cartoon drawings illustrating torture techniques and a video from the
former officials who were responsible for the torture program
explaining their rationale. 97 Museum guests were then asked to vote
on whether they supported the use of torture to prevent future
92. Alex von Tunzelmann, Zero Dark Thirty’s Torture Scenes are
Controversial and Historically Dubious, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 8:42 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2013/jan/25/zero-dark-thirty-reelhistory.
93. Id.
94. IMO Quest, Gingy Torture Scene from Shrek, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U88CwRjbnY4 (featuring a clip from the movie
Shrek originally produced by Dreamworks Animation Studios); Fandango Family,
Minions—Torturing Minions Scene | Fandango Family, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxTVW-f9D98 (featuring a clip from the movie
Minions originally produced by Illumination Entertainment).
95. Julian Borger, Guantánamo Lawyers See Issues in Torture Exhibit at Spy
Museum, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2019/may/27/international-spy-museum-washington-torture-exhibitguantanamo.
96. Emma Loop & Jason Leopold, Democratic Senators Have Been Privately
Pushing a Major Museum to Change a Controversial Torture Exhibit, BUZZFEED
(Dec. 19, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emmaloop/
senators-intelligence-committee-spy-museum-torture.
97. Id.
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attacks. 98 Trivial though some of the examples may seem, they are
evidence of a society that is ignorant to the truth of what happened.
These examples illustrate a society that has been conditioned to view
torture as at least acceptable in some circumstances, if not admirable,
or even humorous.
Another domestic consequence of the failure to hold torturers
accountable is that many of them have returned to government.
Examples include Gina Haspel, who oversaw a torture site and helped
destroy videos of torture sessions, yet was promoted to CIA Director
under the Trump administration. 99 Steven Bradbury, another attorney
who collaborated to produce the torture memos and was also
appointed to a senior role in the Trump administration as General
Counsel for the Department of Transportation. 100 Not only did a
president successfully seek office based in part on a campaign promise
to bring back torture, but he also welcomed alumni of the torture
program into his administration. 101 These developments have
perpetuated a culture of impunity for abuses and signaled that
involvement in an atrocity such as torture is not an obstacle to
regaining power in the U.S. government.
B. Credibility in Pressing for Accountability
Worldwide
In addition to the compounding harms emanating from impunity
for torture that can be seen within the United States, there are also
global consequences. It is already the case that the torture program,
the lack of accountability for those who perpetuated it, and U.S.
attacks on the International Criminal Court have given other
governments a ready-made excuse to justify their own crimes and
98. Id.
99. Amanda Holpuch, Who is Gina Haspel? Donald Trump’s Pick for CIA
Chief Linked to Torture Site, THE GUARDIAN (May 9, 2018, 9:24 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/13/who-is-gina-haspel-trump-ciadirector-torture-site-link.
100. Rebecca Morin, ‘Torture Memo’ Author Nominated for Trump
Administration Post, POLITICO (June 5, 2017, 10:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/06/05/trump-nominee-torture-bradbury-239167.
101. Jonathan Turley, Gina Haspel’s CIA Nomination is a Women’s Milestone
We’d be Wise to Avoid, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/14/gina-haspel-nomination-welcome-u-swhere-torture-rocket-fuel-your-career-jonathan-turley-column/423619002/.
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impunity. The Trump-era Executive Order pushed many actors to
point out that the United States could have avoided such a clash with
the Court by utilizing its own justice system to hold abusers
accountable. 102 The International Bar Association stated, “Instead of
harassing ICC staff, the U.S. should get its own house in order by
providing and demanding genuine accountability.” 103
A key example of how U.S. efforts to shield itself from
accountability undermine its stated goals of holding others
accountable occurred in the case of Serbia, as the United States
consistently threatened to cut off aid to Serbia in order to incentivize
the country to comply with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 104 Yet the U.S. actually subsequently
suspended aid because Serbia refused to sign a bilateral agreement
shielding U.S. personnel from the ICC. 105 The message was clear: the
United States government expects accountability for other States but
immunity for itself. Accordingly, in 2014, former U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture, Juan Méndez, warned that U.S. refusal to hold
torturers accountable was bolstering the arguments of other
governments seeking to ignore their own accountability
requirements. 106 Indeed, in 2014, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry
chided the international community for focusing on its human rights
abuses while ignoring “inhuman torture practiced by the CIA.” 107
Then in 2018, an Iranian official denounced the United States as a

102. Beth Van Schaack, The Int’l Criminal Court Executive Order: Global
Reactions Compiled, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/
72256/the-intl-criminal-court-executive-order-global-reactions-compiled/ (quoting
the International Bar Association).
103. Id.
104. Steven Woehrel, U.S. Conditions on Aid to Serbia, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 3 (Jan. 7, 2008), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS21686.pdf.
105. 35 Nations Losing Military Aid Over World Tribunal Stance, L.A. TIMES
(July 2, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-jul-02-fg-court2story.html.
106. “If the US Tortures, Why Can’t We Do It?”—UN Expert Says Moral
High Ground Must be Recovered, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON
HUM. RTS. (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display
News.aspx?NewsID=15406&LangID=E.
107. Ray Sanchez, World reacts to U.S. torture report, CNN (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/world/senate-torture-report-world-reaction.
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“rogue regime,” asking, “When will the international community say
enough is enough and force [the] U.S. to act like a normal state?” 108
The Biden administration’s State Department released its first
Country Reports on Human Rights Practice early in 2021, in an effort
to “promot[e] human rights and accountability for rights abuses and
violations.” 109 United States Agency for International Development
headed by Samantha Power issued a celebratory tweet when Sudan
elected to join the ICC, calling it a “key step toward ending
impunity.” 110 But such statements stand in stark contrast to the
looming reality that the United States itself has not embraced such
accountability.
The ICC dispute, followed by the Court’s decision to back away
from holding the U.S. government accountable, now gives the United
States government an opportunity to change course, perhaps the last
opportunity to meaningfully demonstrate that it will affirmatively
choose accountability and break ties with the past. Ignoring this
opportunity would instead solidify this dynamic and gut any
remaining credibility the United States may have in working to
promote human rights worldwide or demand accountability of others.
Indeed, as former General Counsel to the Navy Alberto Mora—a
consistent voice for accountability from the earliest days of the torture
program—noted recently, “By failing to hold ourselves accountable,
we join company with all those regimes that would similarly claim the
right to act with impunity and to hold themselves exempt from the
requirements of international law—an awful precedent that gives
shelter to rogue nations.” 111

108. Van Schaack, supra note 102 (quoting Iranian official).
109. DEP’T OF STATE, 2020 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
(March 30, 2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-humanrights-practices/.
110. Samantha Power (@PowerUSAID), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2021, 9:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/PowerUSAID/status/1422588502894653440.
111. Alberto Mora, Director, ABA Rule of Law Initiative, Keynote Address at
American Bar Association Law Day Celebration (March 3, 2021) (on file with
author).
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C. Ramifications for the International Criminal Court
and International Justice
When Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the Biden
administration would be rescinding Trump-era Executive Order
13928, thus ending the economic sanctions and visa restrictions that
had previously been imposed upon ICC personnel, he nonetheless
made sure to specify that the United States would continue to resist
the ICC’s jurisdiction. 112 Blinken stated, “We continue to disagree
strongly with the ICC’s actions relating to the Afghanistan and
Palestinian situations. We maintain our longstanding objection to the
Court’s efforts to assert jurisdiction over personnel of non-States
Parties such as the United States and Israel.” 113 He then supportively
alluded to critiques of the Court: “We are encouraged that State
Parties to the Rome Statute are considering a broad range of reforms
to help the Court prioritize its resources and to achieve its core
mission of serving as a court of last resort in punishing and deterring
atrocity crimes.” 114 Interestingly, he also reiterated a U.S.
commitment to international investigative mechanisms “to realize the
promise of justice for victims of atrocities,” but specifically for “Iraq,
Syria, and Burma.” 115
This statement from the Secretary of State neatly summarized
many of the challenges to international justice mechanisms generally,
and the International Criminal Court specifically. The ICC is regarded
by many as suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. 116 Several factors
underlie this perceived crisis: the lethargic pace of cases, the low tally
of successful prosecutions, and the Court’s thus-far exclusive
prosecutorial focus on Africa. 117 These are serious critiques with
major implications for the Court’s ability to sustain itself as a viable
112. Blinken, supra note 4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Caleb H. Wheeler, In the Spotlight: The Legitimacy of the International
Criminal Court, INT’L L. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2018), https://internationallaw.blog/2018/
10/22/in-the-spotlight-the-legitimacy-of-the-international-criminal-court/.
117. See e.g., David Bosco, Why is the International Criminal Court Picking
Only on Africa?, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-picking-only-onafrica/2013/03/29/cb9bf5da-96f7-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss1/3

22

Beavers: Where Do They Go for Justice? The United States International Cri

2021]

WHERE DO THEY GO FOR JUSTICE?

107

arbiter of international justice. Many of them are also directly relevant
to the dispute at hand between the Court and the United States. In
particular, the Court’s much-maligned focus on Africa points to a
large existential question: can an international criminal court be
empowered to succeed if it is not empowered to hold powerful States
accountable alongside the weaker ones?
United States rhetoric against the Court is steeped in an
unwillingness to confront its own harms. Bolton’s 2018 speech
attacking the Court stated, “[T]he largely unspoken, but always
central, aim of its most vigorous supporters was to constrain the
United States. The objective was not limited to targeting individual
U.S. service members, but rather America’s senior political
leadership, and its relentless determination to keep our country
secure.” 118 When the Bush administration announced its decision to
un-sign the Rome Statute, then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld stated:
By putting U.S. men and women in uniform at risk of politicized
prosecutions, the ICC could well create a powerful disincentive for
U.S. military engagement in the world. If so, it could be a recipe for
isolationism—something that would be unfortunate for the world,
given that our country is committed to engagement in the world and
to contributing to a more peaceful and stable world.119

Even Secretary of State Blinken’s statement announcing eased
sanctions for ICC personnel reflected hypocrisy in the U.S. position.
His statement reiterated opposition to investigations into the U.S.
while expressing support for investigations into other countries with
less power and military influence such as Syria, Iraq, and Burma.
It is difficult not to conclude from this pattern of behavior that the
U.S. is indeed a champion of accountability and the rule of law, but
only so long as such efforts do not threaten its own power or alliances.
If that is not the case, the current breakdown in the ICC investigation
offers a ready-made opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate otherwise
by working to secure rather than evade justice. A Court that is
functionally barred from the ability to assess the crimes of global
118. Bolton, supra note 5.
119. Donald Rumsfeld, Statement on the ICC Treaty, SCOOP WORLD (May 7,
2002, 10:06 AM), https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0205/S00010/secretaryrumsfeld-statement-on-the-icc-treaty.htm?from-mobile=bottom-link-01.
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superpowers will continue to be definitionally limited to focusing its
prosecutorial pressure on everyone else. Most of the world’s
resources, people, and power belong to states that are not members of
the ICC. 120 Thus, the practical effect is a two-tiered system of
international accountability that results in justice for some but
impunity for the rest. Accordingly, the outcome is determined by the
relative power of the states perpetrating the crimes. 121 Such a system
in turn reinforces global injustices of race, wealth, resources, and
power, and renders the system itself unjust.
V. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROCEED?
The stakes are clearly far too high to maintain the status quo.
How, then, should the U.S. government proceed amidst its ongoing
tensions with the ICC and the Court’s failure to ensure accountability
for U.S. torture in Afghanistan and beyond? Two main paths exist
moving forward.
A. Pathway One: Submit to Standards of Accountability
Expected From Other Governments
The Rome Statute’s complementarity standard prohibits the Court
from moving forward with investigations and prosecutions when the
state in question is in the process of conducting its own genuine
processes. This is a process that the United States has supported and
even pushed for, including in Darfur, Uganda, and Libya.122
120. David Bosco, How to Respond When the International Criminal Court
Goes After America, LAWFARE (Dec. 3, 2017, 10:00 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/
how-respond-when-international-criminal-court-goes-after-america.
121. Id.
122. Examples of the United States supporting ICC prosecution of officials
who have not been held accountable by their own governments include pushing for
the indictment and celebrating the convictions of Lord’s Resistance Army leader
Dominic Ongwen from Uganda, voting in favor of a U.N. Security Council
resolution authorizing the ICC to investigate human rights abuses in Libya under
Muammar Gaddafi’s government, and not vetoing a Security Council resolution
authorizing investigation and prosecution of abuses in Darfur, Sudan. See U.N.
Security Council Refers Darfur to the ICC, HUM. RTS. WATCH (March 31, 2005),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/03/31/un-security-council-refers-darfur-icc; Libya:
What the Security Council Has Done For Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (March 1,
2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/01/libya-what-security-council-has-donejustice#; Ned Price, Welcoming the Verdict in the Case Against Dominic Ongwen
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Furthermore, this is a requirement for the U.S. through its other
international legal commitments such as the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“CAT”). 123 When the Court entertained the idea of an
investigation of U.S. actions in Afghanistan, the pushback to the
Court’s assertion of jurisdiction merely centered on the status of the
United States as a non-member state. However, now that the Court
seems to have ceased looking into U.S. behavior, the United States has
three main options for salvaging the possibility of justice for its
conduct in Afghanistan.
First, the U.S. government could publicly announce that it has
already met the complementarity standard through its own
investigations, which has led to a genuine decision not to prosecute
those most responsible for the torture program. This option would
require the U.S. government to disclose documents supporting this
assertion, particularly from the closed Durham investigation.124
Information currently public indicates that no senior official has ever
been criminally investigated for any crimes of torture. 125
Second, if unable to demonstrate that it has achieved
complementarity in the form of a genuine investigation, another
option would be for the United States to launch its own investigation.
However, pursuing this option presents several obstacles. In the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”), the U.S. Congress
amended the War Crimes Act in a targeted effort to extend immunity
to the perpetrators of post-9/11 torture. 126 Additionally, officials
would likely point to the OLC “torture memos” and assert that they

for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, U.S. STATE DEP’T (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/welcoming-the-verdict-in-the-case-against-dominic-ongwenfor-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/.
123. The Convention Against Torture (CAT) not only prohibits the practice of
torture but requires prosecution of offenders. G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 7.1., Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(June 26, 1987).
124. See Holder Press Release, supra note 79.
125. Findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Apr. 26, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/25/numbers/findingsdetainee-abuse-and-accountability-project [hereinafter “DAA Project”].
126. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2633
(2006).
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relied on them in good faith in the defense of their actions. 127
However, the provisions found in the MCA could be repealed, and
even if they remained in place, a court would perhaps not uphold them
as a lawful amnesty for such atrocities.
As to reliance on the OLC memos, it is far from certain that the
Court would find them sufficient to excuse torturers from being held
accountable for their actions. Their authors were found by the OPR to
have committed malpractice in writing them, and they have long since
been rescinded. 128 Even the authors of the memo were doubtful their
analysis would be upheld by a court, writing, “we cannot predict with
confidence whether a court would agree with [our] conclusion,” but
assuring readers that “the question is unlikely to be subject to judicial
inquiry.” 129 Regardless, the memo should not serve as a cover for
those who wrote them, requested them, or acted outside their
permissive scope. Fundamentally, the question is not whether
prosecutions are certain to be successful, but instead the question rests
on whether the United States is willing to pursue them at all.
Moreover, complementarity does not necessarily require prosecutions.
It may be acceptable for the United States to demonstrate a good faith
criminal investigation that concludes with an official record of
wrongdoing, even if no formal criminal charges are brought due to the
legal obstacles at play.
The true limitation on this particular avenue is the total lack of
political will. Reflecting on how the so-called “justice cascade” of
international accountability has seemingly failed to affect the U.S.,
Kathryn Sikkink noted the continued power dynamics:
The United States has now entered into the debate that has been
going on throughout the world for the last thirty years about the
desirability of accountability. But because U.S. actions involved
citizens from many countries, and took place on a global scale, the
debate about accountability is a global debate. In the U.S. case, not
127. United States: Investigate Bush, Other Top Officials for Torture, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (July 11, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/united-statesinvestigate-bush-other-top-officials-torture.
128. Memorandum from Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. David J. Barron to the
Att’y Gen., Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions
(Apr. 15, 2009), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/withdraw-0409.pdf.
129. DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE
272 (2009).
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only was there no ‘ruptured’ transition that undermined the power
of the leaders of the previous regime, but the officials from the
Bush administration . . . continue to be powerful actors in politics
and the media. Human rights prosecutions have had greatest
support where there are large numbers of national victims, willing
to march in the streets demanding accountability for violations. In
the United States, no one was marching in the streets. The victims
of the human rights violations of the Bush administration were for
the most part foreigners, with foreign names, and without large or
active constituencies in the United States. 130

She nonetheless points out that the “the real test of international law
and new norms will be their ability to influence the actions of even the
most powerful States.” 131
Third, the United States could fulfill its obligations by admitting it
is “unable and unwilling” to hold its own citizens accountable for such
atrocities pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, but would invite
and cooperate with a renewed investigation by the International
Criminal Court. However, this pathway comes with its own steep
obstacles. One significant hurdle is the previously discussed American
Servicemembers Protection Act, dubbed the “Hague Invasion Act.” 132
This statute remains in effect to this day and was enacted as part of the
George W. Bush administration’s multi-pronged campaign against the
ICC to prohibit U.S. participation in the Court’s efforts to investigate
U.S. personnel. 133 But, of course, this statute like any other can still be
amended or repealed.
The true obstacle to submitting to the Court’s jurisdiction is the
massive amount of political capital that doing so would require. After
decades of consistent anti-Court rhetoric by U.S. government officials,
the American public and many political actors instinctively view the
Court as a rogue actor that has long been conspiring to launch
“politicized” prosecutions against U.S. forces for simply fulfilling
what is framed as their proper role as a global military superpower. 134
A decision to acquiesce to the Court’s review would unquestionably
spark intense backlash, heated debate, and possibly even panic. But as
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE 220 (2011).
Id. at 189.
ASPA, supra note 9.
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 10.
See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 5.
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Gen. Wes Clark, former supreme allied commander of NATO has
insisted, the U.S. should welcome rather than fear the Court’s
scrutiny. 135 Drawing on personal experience in having his actions
reviewed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia when the tribunal assessed potential war crimes by NATO
under his command in Kosovo, Gen. Wes Clark acknowledged that
while it is indeed “uncomfortable,” the “[g]reat nations are willing to
face the truth, accept accountability, and admit their mistakes.” 136
The U.S. could set a precedent that no one is above the law, by
acknowledging that it is unable or unwilling to hold its own officials
accountable and by inviting the International Criminal Court’s
investigation accordingly. Conversely, any failure by the United States
to administer truth or accountability through its own domestic
channels or to cooperate in good faith with a Court investigation
effectively serves as a final nail in the coffin for any remaining
plausible deniability of the reality that international criminal justice
selectively applies to some but not to all.
B. Pathway Two: Create an Equitable International
Justice Mechanism
There may be another pathway, but it would also require honesty
and integrity in acknowledging the unjust present reality and spending
the political capital that is necessary for change. If the U.S. is
unwilling to hold itself to the same standards of accountability that are
expected of other nations, the U.S. should endeavor towards setting a
standard that it is willing to meet.
If the United States has a stated goal of serving as a world leader
in the fight for human rights and against impunity for atrocities, the
U.S. should lead an international diplomatic process to confront the
reality that the current two-tiered system of international justice is
inherently unjust. The U.S. should acknowledge its own role in
creating that reality and commit to securing an equitable application of
the law. Ideally, this would entail working with other global
superpowers to advocate for and secure certain reforms to the ICC’s
135. Wesley K. Clark, The United States Has Nothing to Fear From the ICC,
FOREIGN POLICY (July 2, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/02/theunited-states-has-nothing-to-fear-from-the-icc/.
136. Id.
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procedures in exchange for ratification by those States of the amended
Rome Statute. One key reform could include a codified expansion of
the complementarity principle, in which multiple mechanisms for
accountability could satisfy the requirement, including truth
commissions, official apologies, restitution to victims, legal reforms to
prevent future abuses, or a combination thereof. One concern that
would likely arise from this proposal is whether an expanded
complementarity principle would water down the standard of
international justice and effectively diminish the Court’s ability to
secure high-level prosecutions. But in truth, this concern is already the
present reality. So long as it operates without the cooperation of global
superpowers, the Court is severely limited in its ability to prosecute
and convict rogue actors. Thus, the Court is effectively barred from
operating a system in which no one is above the law. It is under the
status quo that powerful human rights abusers are shielded from any
consequences at all, let alone criminal prosecution. Under an
expanded complementarity system, perpetrators would at least be
forced to reckon with their abuses in some manner that gainfully
contributes to the cause of international justice.
Samuel Moyn predicted that “strong and wealthy nations are
never going to legally mandate their own loss of superiority and
money—and no court will dare call them enemies of mankind for not
doing so.” 137 This may perhaps be the case. If it is, and global
superpowers led by the United States are unwilling to enter even into a
reformed international criminal justice system, then it is difficult to
imagine the sustainability of the core ICC model in the long term.
The Court will likely succumb to its many critiques, and will
eventually be forced to recognize the impossibility of facilitating a
permanent system for criminal justice that applies to some but not to
all. Indeed, some critics believe this would be a just outcome, and that
a model of individual criminal prosecutions is not the right mechanism
with which to right the wrongs of global atrocities. Martti
Koskenniemi is one such critic, who believes the trials of a few can
never address the scale of the suffering, and that:
[W]hen trials are conducted by a foreign prosecutor, and before
foreign judges, no moral community is being affirmed beyond the
elusive and self-congratulatory ‘international community.’ Every
137. SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USES OF HISTORY 68 (2014).
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failure to prosecute is a scandal, every judgment too little to restore
the dignity of the victims, and no symbolism persuasive enough to
justify the drawing of the thick line between the past and the
future. 138

Whether a permanent ICC can survive and achieve its stated goals
remains to be seen. But regardless of which pathway is chosen, the
fallout from the U.S.-ICC Afghanistan dispute is likely an inflection
point that will help to determine both the fate of the Court and the role
of the U.S. as a leading international advocate for accountability and
human rights. With these high stakes, it is essential that the U.S.
choose a path that leads to justice.
CONCLUSION
If the United States complied with requirements of accountability,
it would have to exploit precious political capital to re-open wounds
from abuses that took place nearly two decades ago. Additionally, this
option would likely require repeal of statutes amidst seemingly
insurmountable political polarization and dysfunction in the U.S.
Congress. In the event of resulting domestic prosecutions, there would
likely be lengthy litigation that may not actually lead to convictions.
Thus, there is very little political incentive for the U.S. government to
pursue this option.
Conversely, working multilaterally to expand the Court’s
membership is likewise no easy task. Many will likely push back
against efforts to deviate from individual prosecutions as the official
standard of complementarity. Further, the larger nations such as the
United States whose cooperation would be essential for success have
little appetite to take on an endeavor of this magnitude.
The alternative is possibly the slow death of the promise of
international criminal justice. Any path the United States chooses to
take moving forward will be difficult. These paths moving forward,
though unappealing, are the inevitable consequences stemming from
the U.S. government’s choice to design, build, execute, and provide
cover for a torture program. But accountability is never easy, and the
rule of law is worth laboring to protect.

138. STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 128-29 (2013)
(quoting Koskenniemi).
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